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Abstract
We study a pricing problem where buyers with non-uniform demand purchase one of many items. Each buyer has a known
benefit for each item and purchases the item that gives the largest utility, which is defined to be the difference between the benefit
and the price of the item. The optimization problem is to decide on the prices that maximize total revenue of the seller. This problem
is also called the optimal product line design problem in the absence of competition.
Even though the general problem is known to be NP-hard, it can be solved efficiently under some natural assumptions on
customer benefits. In this paper we study properties of optimal solutions and present a dynamic programming algorithm when
customer benefits satisfy the Monge property. The same algorithm can also be used to solve the problem under the additional
requirement that all buyers should be served.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we study a pricing problem where given a collection of buyers and a collection of available items,
the seller wants to decide on the prices of the items so as to maximize his revenue. The buyers are assumed to have
individual demand levels and the items are available in unlimited supply. Each buyer has a given benefit for each item
and purchases the item that maximizes his utility provided that the utility, which is defined as the difference between
the benefit and the price of the item, is non-negative. This is a relatively common utility model in economic theory
known as the linear utility model, see [7]. We also consider a variation of this problem where each buyer has to be
served and therefore prices have to be set in such a way that for each buyer there is at least one item that gives a
non-negative utility.
A possible application of this model could be in the telecommunications industry where a mobile phone operator
has to decide on which calling plans to offer and how to price these plans to maximize revenue. A “buyer”, in this
context, corresponds to a group of customers with similar needs and purchasing power. This is a reasonable model as
marketing departments of these companies typically segregate their customer base into segments with similar behavior.
The estimated number of customers in each group gives the demand of each “buyer”. Similarly, “items” correspond
to different calling plans of which each buyer can choose at most one. Clearly, our model in this context overlooks the
potential effects of other service providers and assumes that the customer base is indifferent to external events. This
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problem is also known as the optimal product line design problem in the absence of competition. The term “product
line” here refers to a collection of substitutable products. See [9] for an early reference and [8] for recent references.
Formally, we define the pricing problem as follows: Let I = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of buyers, J = {1, . . . ,m}
denote the set of items, Di ∈ R+ denote the demand of buyer i ∈ I , and Bi, j ∈ R+ denote the benefit of buyer i ∈ I
for obtaining item j ∈ J . Without loss of generality, we assume that problem data satisfies B 6= 0 and D > 0. Given
a price vector P ∈ Rm+ , the assignment vector α ∈ J n, maps each buyer to one of the items that maximizes his utility.
In other words, for i ∈ I ,
Bi,α(i) − Pα(i) ≥ Bi, j − Pj
for all j ∈ J . If there is a tie, we assume that the buyer is mapped to the item with the higher benefit, and therefore
with higher price. We break further ties by mapping the buyer to the item with the smaller index. Buyer i purchases
item α(i) provided that Bi,α(i) ≥ Pα(i). If Bi,α(i) < Pα(i), we assume that the buyer does not purchase any of the items
and his demand is unsatisfied. The resulting total revenue for the seller is∑
i∈I :Bi,α(i)≥Pα(i)
Di Pα(i).
Therefore, the optimization problem becomes,
z = max
P∈Rm+
 ∑
i∈I :Bi,α(i)≥Pα(i)
Di Pα(i) : α ∈ J n, Bi,α(i) − Pα(i) ≥ Bi, j − Pj ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J
 .
The pricing problem [2] and its variations [5,6] are known to be NP-hard.
It is also possible to formulate this problem as a bi-linear mixed-integer program (see [3] for a similar formulation):
Maximize
∑
i∈I
Di
∑
j∈J
xi, j p j
Subject to:
∑
j∈J
xi, j ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I
ui ≥ Bi, j − p j for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J
ui =
∑
j∈J
xi, j (Bi, j − p j ) for all i ∈ I
u, p ≥ 0,
x ∈ {0, 1}n×m,
where xi, j denotes whether or not buyer i buys item j ; p j denotes the price of item j ; and, ui denotes the utility of
buyer i . As u ≥ 0, if all items give negative utility for a buyer i , the solution has xi, j = 0 for all j ∈ J .
We note that it is also possible to produce a linear formulation for the pricing problem by introducing (i) a new
set of variables yi j ≥ 0 that stand for the product xi j p j , and, (ii) a new set of linearization constraints based on
max{0, p j − M j (1− xi j )} ≤ yi j ≤ min{p j ,M j xi j }, where M j is a valid bound on p j such as maxi∈I {Bi, j }.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we describe the Monge property and related assumptions
on buyer benefits. We then study structure of optimal solutions under these assumptions. In Section 3, we study
the pricing problem when all buyers have to be served and present a dynamic programming algorithm. Finally, in
Section 4, we relax the restriction that all buyers have to be served and show that the pricing problem still admits a
dynamic programming algorithm if buyer benefits satisfy the extended Monge property.
2. Monge property and basic results
In the rest of the paper, we study the pricing problem when the benefit matrix B is a Monge matrix. A matrix
C ∈ Rn×m is said to satisfy theMonge property if
Ci j + Crs ≥ Cis + Cr j for all 1 ≤ i < r ≤ m, 1 ≤ j < s ≤ n. (1)
To be precise, this property is actually called the inverse Monge property, which is same as the Monge property after
re-ordering the rows and columns of the matrix C . It is easy to show that inequality (1) holds provided that Monge
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property holds for adjacent rows and columns
Ci j + Ci+1, j+1 ≥ Ci, j+1 + Ci+1, j for all 1 ≤ i < m, 1 ≤ j < n. (2)
An early reference for an optimization application of this property dates back to 1781 when the French mathematician
Gaspard Monge studied the problem of moving earth to build forts. The term “Monge property” evolved from the
work of Hoffman [4] generalizing Monge’s property that optimal solutions to transportation problems on the plane
should not have crossing paths. Since then a number of optimization problems have been studied in the presence of
this property, we refer the reader to [1] for a detailed survey.
We say that a matrix C ∈ Rn×m satisfies the extended Monge property provided that all of the following three
assumptions hold:
Assumption 1. For all 1 ≤ i < n and 1 ≤ j < m
Ci, j − Ci, j+1 ≥ Ci+1, j − Ci+1, j+1.
Assumption 2. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j < m
Ci, j ≥ Ci, j+1.
Assumption 3. For all 1 ≤ i < n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m
Ci, j ≥ Ci+1, j .
When applied to the benefit matrix B, Assumptions 2 and 3 order items and buyers in such a way that items
with smaller indices are more beneficial for all buyers; and buyers with smaller indices obtain larger benefit from
obtaining any item and therefore, they obtain larger utility in the optimal solution independent of how the prices are
set. Combined with the Monge property of Assumption 1, these assumptions imply that buyers with smaller indices
value money less, that is, they are relatively indifferent to prices, and therefore, they are more likely to buy items that
they value most.
Finally, we also note that if Assumption 1 holds for the benefit matrix B, then, (i) Bi, j − Bi, j+1 ≥ Bn, j − Bn, j+1
and therefore Assumption 2 reduces to requiring Bn, j − Bn, j+1 ≥ 0 for all j ∈ J \ {m}, and, (ii) Bi, j − Bi+1, j ≥
Bi,m − Bi+1,m and Assumption 3 reduces to Bi,m − Bi+1,m ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I \ {n}.
2.1. Basic properties independent of the assumptions
We next describe a natural property of the assignment vectors associated with similar price vectors.
Proposition 1. Let P1, P2 ∈ Rm be two price vectors and let α1, α2 ∈ J n be the corresponding assignment vectors.
Furthermore, let P1j = P2j for all j ∈ J \ {k}, and P2k > P1k . Then α1(i) = α2(i) for all i ∈ I such that α1(i) 6= k.
Proof. Let i ∈ I be such that α1(i) = t 6= k. As Bi,t − P1t ≥ Bi, j − P1j for all j ∈ J by definition and P2 ≥ P1, we
have Bi,t − P2t = Bi,t − P1t ≥ Bi, j − P2j for all j ∈ J as well. 
In other words, if the price of an item is increased, the only change in the assignment vector is due to the buyers
abandoning this item. Next, we describe a basic property of optimal price vectors. Given an optimal assignment vector,
the following observation relates optimal prices to buyer benefits. This observation has stronger implications under
Assumptions 1 and 2.
Proposition 2. Let P ∈ Rm be a price vector and α ∈ J n be the corresponding assignment vector. Let I¯ = {i ∈ I :
Bi,α(i) ≥ Pα(i)}, J¯ = { j ∈ J : j = α(i) for some i ∈ I¯ }, and let P ′ = min j∈ J¯ {Pj } be the price of the cheapest item
that has a buyer. Let I¯ ′ = {i ∈ I¯ : Pα(i) = P ′}, then either
min
i∈ I¯ ′
{Bi,α(i)} = P ′,
or, the total revenue
∑
i∈ I¯ Di Pα(i) can be improved while serving the same set of customers I¯ .
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Proof. Assume δ = mini∈ I¯ ′{Bi,α(i)} − P ′ > 0. In this case prices for all j ∈ J¯ ′ = { j ∈ J¯ : Pj = P ′} can be
increased uniformly by δ/2. Notice that with the new prices Bi,α(i) ≥ P ′α(i) still holds for all i ∈ I¯ . The assignment
vector α does not necessarily reflect buyer preferences correctly for the new prices, but by Proposition 1 none of the
buyers in I¯ \ I¯ ′ change their assignment after seeing the new prices, and all buyers in I¯ ′ now either pay more for the
same item or buy more expensive items. Therefore, total revenue increases. 
2.2. Structural properties under one of the assumptions
We next present a strong structural property of the assignment vector when the buyer benefits satisfy the Monge
property. Note that the following observation holds for any price vector, including suboptimal ones.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 1, for any given price vector P ∈ Rm , the corresponding assignment vector α ∈ J n
has no crossing. In other words, α(i + 1) ≥ α(i) for all i ∈ I \ {n}.
Proof. Remember that, by definition, for i ∈ I , α(i) satisfies Bi,α(i)− Pα(i) ≥ Bi, j − Pj for all j ∈ J , and in the case
of a tie, the buyer is assigned to the item with the higher benefit (price), and if there is still a tie, to the item with the
smallest index.
Assume that α does not satisfy the claim for some i ∈ I \ {n} and let α(i + 1) = j and α(i) = k where j < k. If
both i and i + 1 are indifferent to items j and k, that is, if Bi,k − Pk = Bi, j − Pj , and Bi+1,k − Pk = Bi+1, j − Pj ,
then, as the ties are broken the same way, α(i) = α(i + 1), a contradiction. We can therefore assume that at least one
of i or i + 1 strictly prefers the assigned item.
In this case, if buyer i has a strict preference, i.e. Bi,k − Pk > Bi, j − Pj we combine this inequality with
Bi+1, j − Pj ≥ Bi+1,k − Pk , to obtain
Bi,k − Bi, j > Pk − Pj ≥ Bi+1,k − Bi+1, j .
More precisely, Bi+1, j − Bi+1,k > Bi, j − Bi,k where k > j . Note this inequality can also be established if buyer i +1
has a strict preference for j . This inequality can be re-written as
k−1∑
l= j
Bi+1,l − Bi+1,l+1 >
k−1∑
l= j
Bi,l − Bi,l+1
which is inconsistent with Assumption 1 when considered term by term. 
A direct consequence of the above result is that under Assumption 1, there is an optimal assignment vector that
partitions the buyers into contiguous groups with the same assigned item. In other words, for any i ∈ I \ {n}, either
α(i) = α(i + 1), or, α(i) < α(i + 1). Therefore, there is a partition of I = ∪kl=1 Cl where Cl = {sl , . . . , tl} and
α(i) = αl for all i ∈ Cl . Furthermore, αl < αl+1 for l = 1, . . . , k − 1. This observation is one of the main building
blocks of the dynamic programming algorithm described later. We demonstrate this structure in Fig. 1 for k = 4.
We next present a basic property of prices of items that have at least one potential buyer in a solution. Note that the
following observation is also valid for any price vector, not only the optimal one.
Proposition 4. Given a price vector P ∈ Rm and the corresponding assignment vector α ∈ J n , let J¯ = { j ∈ J :
j = α(i) for some i ∈ I } denote the set of desired items. Then, under Assumption 2, if j1 < j2 for j1, j2 ∈ J¯ , then
Pj1 > Pj2 .
Proof. Assume the claim is wrong, and Pj1 ≤ Pj2 . Note that there can be no i ∈ I for which α(i) = j2 as Bi, j1 ≥ Bi, j2
and Pj2 ≥ Pj1 imply that Bi, j1 − Pj1 ≥ Bi, j2 − Pj2 . This gives a contradiction even when Bi, j1 − Pj1 = Bi, j2 − Pj2 ,
as ties are broken in the favor of the item with the smaller index. 
Note that there is a high level of degeneracy with regard to the optimal prices as items without a buyer in the
solution, that is j 6∈ J¯ , can assume arbitrarily high prices without changing the assignment vector or total revenue.
It is possible to extend Proposition 4 to show a complete ordering of item prices, including the ones without a buyer.
In other words, we can show that there exists an optimal price vector P ′ with the same assignment vector and total
revenue that satisfies P ′j ≥ P ′j+1 for all j ∈ J \ {m}. This can simply be achieved by setting the prices of the items in
J \ J¯ as high as possible without violating the ordering condition.
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Fig. 1. Partitioning of the buyers due to Monge property.
Next, we present a basic property of assignment vectors under Assumption 3.
Proposition 5. Given a price vector P ∈ Rm and the corresponding assignment vector α ∈ J n , let I¯ = {i ∈ I :
Bi,α(i) ≥ Pα(i)}. Then, under Assumption 3, I¯ = {1, 2, , . . . , i ′} for some i ′ ∈ I .
Proof. Let i ∈ I¯ \ {1}, and consider buyer i − 1 ∈ I . As Bi,α(i) − Pα(i) ≥ 0 and Bi−1,α(i) ≥ Bi,α(i) by Assumption 3,
we have Bi−1,α(i−1) − Pα(i−1) ≥ Bi−1,α(i) − Pα(i) ≥ 0 and therefore i − 1 ∈ I¯ as well. Combining this observation
with the fact that I¯ 6= ∅, the proof is complete. 
3. A DP algorithm for a restricted pricing problem
In this section, we study a restriction of the pricing problem where the price vector P is required to satisfy the
following property
max
j∈J {Bi, j − Pj } ≥ 0
for all i ∈ I . In other words, all buyers need to be assigned to an item with non-negative utility. In this case total
revenue simply becomes
∑
i∈I Di Pα(i).
Throughout this section, we also assume that buyer benefits B ∈ Rn×m satisfy the extended Monge property.
We denote the optimal price vector by P∗ ∈ Rm and the corresponding assignment vector by α∗ ∈ J n . Without loss
of generality, we also assume that the optimal assignment vector partitions buyers into contiguous groups as described
by Proposition 3. In other words, I = ∪kl=1 Cl where Cl = {sl , . . . , tl} and α∗(i) = αl for all i ∈ Cl . Furthermore,
αl < αl+1 for l = 1, . . . , k − 1.
Finally, we will use the following proposition to assume that α1 = 1.
Proposition 6. Without loss of generality, α∗(1) = 1.
Proof. Let α∗(1) = α1 6= 1. By Proposition 4, α1 is the most expensive item that has a buyer, that is, P∗α1 ≥ P∗αl for
l = 1, . . . , k. Furthermore, by Assumption 2, B1,1 ≥ B1,α1 and as α1 6= 1, we also have B1,α1 − P∗α1 > B1,1 − P∗1 .
Since ties are broken in favor of the item with the smaller index, P∗1 > P∗α1 .
Let P∗∗ be the price vector obtained from P∗ by reducing the price of item 1 to P∗α1 and keeping the remaining
prices the same. Also let α∗∗ be the corresponding assignment vector. Clearly, α∗∗(1) = 1. In addition, by
Proposition 1, if α∗∗(i) 6= α∗(i), for some i ∈ I , then α∗∗(i) = 1. In other words, the only assignment that would
change are for buyers who would switch to item 1. As the new price of item 1 is equal to the highest price in the
original solution, the total revenue can only increase.
Therefore, P∗∗ is also an optimal price vector and α∗∗(1) = 1. 
O. Gu¨nlu¨k / Discrete Optimization 5 (2008) 328–336 333
We next present two observation that relate optimal prices to the assignment vector using buyer benefits.
Proposition 7. All customers are served if and only if P∗α∗(n) = Bn,α∗(n).
Proof. Let α∗(n) = αk . As Assumption 3 holds, if Bn,αk = P∗αk , then Bi,αk ≥ P∗αk for all i ∈ I , and therefore, all
buyers are served.
Next, assume that all buyers are served. Note that, by definition, αk is the item with the largest index that has a
buyer. As P∗ is optimal, by Proposition 4, P∗αk is the price of the cheapest item that has a buyer and by Proposition 2,
P∗αk = mini∈Ck {Bi,α(i)} = Bn,αk . 
Proposition 8. For any l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k − 1}, buyer tl is indifferent between items αl and αl+1. In other words, if
k > 1, then Btl ,αl − P∗αl = Btl ,αl+1 − P∗αl+1 .
Proof. Assume the claim does not hold for some l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k − 1}. Since α∗(tl) = αl , we have Btl ,αl − P∗αl ≥
Btl ,αl+1 − P∗αl+1 . If the claim is wrong, tl must strictly prefer item αl , i.e. P∗αl < Btl ,αl + P∗αl+1 − Btl ,αl+1 .
In this case, if P∗αl is increased to P
∗
αl+1 + Btl ,αl − Btl ,αl+1 customer tl would not abandon item αl to buy a cheaper
item, and therefore, by Propositions 1 and 3 , neither would any other customer. Note that P∗αl , and therefore the total
revenue, can be strictly increased, a contradiction. 
A straightforward observation based on Proposition 8 is the following.
Corollary 9. For any l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k − 1}, P∗αl − P∗αl+1 = Btl ,αl − Btl ,αl+1 .
Combining this observation with the fact that Bn,αk = P∗αk by Proposition 7, it is possible to express the optimal
prices using buyer benefits provided that the optimal assignment vector is known. That is,
P∗αl = P∗αk +
k−1∑
q=l
(
P∗αq − P∗αq+1
)
= Bn,αk +
k−1∑
q=l
(
Btq ,αq − Btq ,αq+1
)
.
for all l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k − 1}.
Furthermore, total revenue can also be expressed using buyer benefits. For ease of notation, define D(a, b) =∑b
i=a Di and let αl+1 = m + 1 and Bn,m+1 = 0 and define P∗m+1 = 0. We can now write
n∑
i=1
Di P
∗(α∗(i)) =
k∑
h=1
D(sh, th)P
∗(αh)
=
k∑
h=1
D(sh, th)
(
k∑
l=h
(
P∗(αl)− P∗(αl+1)
))
=
k∑
l=1
D(1, tl)
(
P∗(αl)− P∗(αl+1)
)
=
k∑
l=1
D(1, tl)
(
Btl ,αl − Btl ,αl+1
)
provided that k > 1. If k = 1, then α1 = 1 and z∗ = D(1, n)Bn,1.
In other words, given an optimal assignment vector, it is possible to compute the resulting objective function
value (total revenue) without explicitly constructing the optimal price vector. This observation forms the basis of our
dynamic programming recursion as the problem now reduces to searching for an optimal assignment vector which is
a combinatorial object. We next define a family of problems obtained by perturbing the original problem.
Let PP(a, b) denote the pricing problem with the buyer set reduced to I¯ = {a, . . . , n}, and the item set reduced
to J¯ = {b, . . . ,m}. Furthermore, the demands D¯ for the reduced problem are obtained by setting D¯a = D(1, a) and
D¯i = Di for i > a + 1. The requirement that all buyers should be served still holds for PP(a, b). Notice that if the
original benefit matrix B satisfies any of the Assumptions 1–3, the benefit matrix of the reduced problem also satisfies
the same assumptions.
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Let z∗(a, b) denote the optimal value of PP(a, b). Using this notation, the original problem can now be called
PP(1, 1) and the optimal value of the original problem z∗ is equal to z∗(1, 1). In the following two Propositions, we
relate the optimal value of the reduced problem to the optimal value of the original problem.
Proposition 10. Let b ∈ J , then,
z∗ ≥ D1
(
B1,1 − B1,b
)+ z∗(2, b).
Proof. Given the optimal solution to the reduced problem PP(2, b), it is possible to obtain a solution to the original
problem as follows: By Proposition 6, we can assume that the optimal assignment vector of PP(2, b) assigns buyer 2
to item b. If b > 1, the price vector of the reduced problem is augmented by setting P1 to Pb + B1,1 − B1,b ≥ Pb ≥ 0
and setting prices of all remaining items {2, . . . , b−1} (if any) to a large number to obtain a price vector for the original
problem. Next, we augment the optimal assignment vector of the reduced problem by assigning buyer 1 to item 1 to
construct an assignment vector to the original problem. Note that the augmented price vector is consistent with the
augmented assignment vector. Also note that all buyers are still served as B1,1 − P1 = B1,b − Pb ≥ B2,b − Pb ≥ 0.
The objective value of this solution is z∗(2, b)+ D1
(
B1,1 − B1,b
)
. 
Proposition 11. Let α∗ be the optimal assignment vector for the pricing problem. Then,
z∗ = D1
(
B1,1 − B1,α∗(2)
)+ z∗(2, α∗(2)).
Proof. First note that if α∗(2) = 1, that is, α∗(1) = α∗(2), the claim is correct as z∗ = z∗(2, 1). On the other hand,
assume α∗(2) 6= 1 and therefore the group of buyers assigned to item 1 only consists of buyer 1, i.e., C1 = {1}.
In this case, it is possible to truncate the solution to the pricing problem by deleting buyer 1 and items
1, . . . , α∗(2)− 1 to obtain a solution to PP(2, α∗(2)), implying
z∗(2, α∗(2)) ≥ z∗ − D1
(
P∗1 − P∗α∗(2)
)
= z∗ − D1
(
B1,1 − B1,α∗(2)
)
Observing that z∗(2, α∗(2)) ≤ z∗ − D1
(
B1,1 − B1,α∗(2)
)
by Proposition 10 completes the proof. 
Combining Propositions 10 and 11 , we have therefore shown that:
z∗ = z∗(1, 1) = max
b∈J
{
D1
(
B1,1 − B1,b
)+ z∗(2, b)} (3)
which leads to the following dynamic programming recursion:
Proposition 12. For all i ∈ I \ {1, n} and j ∈ J
z∗(i, j) = max
b∈{ j,...,m}
{
D(1, i)
(
Bi, j − Bi,b
)+ z∗(i + 1, b)}
Proof. It suffices to apply inequality (3) after renumbering buyers and items in PP(i, j) starting from 1 instead of i
and j . 
Finally, as PP(n, j) is a trivial problem with a single buyer, we have z∗(n, j) = D(1, n)Bn, j by Proposition 6.
Therefore under Monge property and with the additional requirement that all buyers are served, the pricing problem
can be solved by the dynamic programming algorithm (Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1
for j = m down to 1 do
z∗(n, j) = D(1, n)Bn, j
end do
for i = n − 1 down to 2 do
for j = m down to 1 do
z∗(i, j) = max
b∈{ j,...,m}
{
D(1, i)
(
Bi, j − Bi,b
)+ z∗(i + 1, b)}
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end do
end do
z∗ = z∗(1, 1) = max
b∈J
{
D1
(
B1,1 − B1,b
)+ z∗(2, b)}
After applying Algorithm 1, it is straightforward to construct the optimal solution as follows: First set α∗1 = 1.
Then, for the remaining buyers i ∈ I \ {1}, sequentially set α∗i to the item b ≥ α∗i−1 that satisfies
z∗(i, b) = z∗(i − 1, α∗i−1)− D(1, i − 1)(Bi−1,α∗i−1 − Bi−1,b).
The optimal prices can now be constructed by Proposition 2 and Corollary 9. Therefore, we have shown the following
result.
Theorem 13. If all buyers have to be served and buyer benefits satisfy Assumptions 1–3, then the pricing problem can
be solved by Algorithm 1 in O(nm2) time using a state space of size O(nm).
4. A DP algorithm under the extended Monge property
In this section we show that Algorithm 1, with minor modifications, solves the pricing problem if buyer benefits
satisfy extended Monge property. In other words, we drop the requirement that all buyers need to be served. In this
case, by Proposition 5 , the collection of buyers with non-negative utility in the optimal solution are I¯ = {i ∈ I :
Bi,α∗(i) ≥ P∗α∗(i)} = {1, 2, . . . , i ′} for some i ′ ∈ I . Therefore, it is possible to solve the pricing problem under the
extendedMonge assumption by solving n (one for each possible value of i ′) instances of the restricted problem studied
in Section 3. Each restricted instance has a subset of the original customers, namely {1, . . . , i ′}, all of which have to
be served. Maximum revenue obtained by the solutions of these restricted problems gives the maximum revenue for
the original problem. This algorithm can actually be improved as described below.
Notice that if a matrix C ∈ Rn×m+ satisfies the extended Monge property then C ′ ∈ Rn×m+1+ also satisfies the
extended Monge property where C ′ is obtained from C by adding a column of zeroes at the end. Therefore, by simply
adding an artificial item which has zero benefit for every buyer, it is possible to generate a new instance of the pricing
problem that satisfies Assumptions 1–3. Furthermore, without loss of generality, the price vector can now be required
to serve all buyers as the price of the new item can always be set to 0 without changing the value of the optimal
solution. It is easy to obtain a one-to-one correspondence between the solutions of the original problem instance
and the new instance by setting the price of the new item to zero and assigning all unserved buyers by the original
problem to the new item. Clearly corresponding solutions of the two problems have the same objective function value.
Therefore, we have the following result.
Theorem 14. If buyer benefits satisfy the extended Monge property, the pricing problem can be solved by dynamic
programming in O(nm2) time using a state space of size O(nm).
Proof. Given an instance of the pricing problem, creates a new instance with the same set of buyers and the item set
J ′ = J ∪{m+1}. The benefit matrix B ′ ∈ Rn×m+1 is obtained from B ∈ Rn×m by setting Bi,m+1 = 0 for the missing
entries. Applying Algorithm 1 to the new instance gives the optimal solution to the original problem. Buyers i ∈ I
with α∗(i) = m + 1 are not served. 
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